



This is the seventh report on the European economy
by the European Economic Advisory Group (EEAG).
For the first time, the contents of the report have been
summarised under a common title: Europe in a glob-
alised world. All chapters deal in one way or another
with the growing interdependence between Europe
and the rest of the world. This applies both to the first
two chapters, which as in earlier years deal with short-
and medium-term macroeconomic issues, and the
subsequent three chapters, which deal with longer-
term issues. 
• Chapter 1 presents our macroeconomic forecast
and analyses monetary and fiscal policy in
Europe. Because of the uncertainty about macro-
economic developments in the US and how they
will be transmitted to the rest of the world as well
as the uncertainty about how decoupled growth in
emerging economies has become from the US
cycle, a global perspective is more relevant than
ever. A crucial issue for macro developments in
Europe is how large and persistent the deprecia-
tion of the US dollar against the euro will be.
Chapter 2 offers an in-depth analysis of this.
• Chapters 3–5 all deal with various long-term
aspects of globalisation. Chapter 3 analyses the
impact of increased economic integration with
low-wage economies on Western European jobs:
the message is that when taking all effects into
account, globalisation is more likely in the end
to raise rather than to reduce employment,
because it will help making labour markets more
flexible. The challenge for policy is to counter
adverse income distribution effects, but to do so
in a way that employment is not harmed.
Chapter 4 argues against using industrial policy
to protect European firms from international
competition because of the long-run costs that
are likely to arise. Industrial policy should be
horizontal rather than sector-based and it
should be located mainly at the regional and EU
level, but cut back at the national level. Chap-
ter 5 addresses one of the most long-term issues
for mankind: global warming. The chapter
points out that most existing analyses have
neglected the supply side. Without a proper
analysis of supply-side effects, demand-reducing
measures, which are generally regarded as self-
evident solutions (such as emission permits,
taxes on fossil fuels and the subsidisation of al-
ternative energy sources) risk being ineffective
and in fact counterproductive.
Chapter 1: Macroeconomic outlook and policy 
Despite the turbulence in the financial markets
caused by the US subprime mortgage crisis, the
world economy developed strongly last year. For the
fourth year in a row, world GDP grew by around
5 percent. During the second half of last year the
risks for a slowdown of the world business cycle
increased considerably. The main reasons are the still
lasting turbulence in financial markets and the slow-
down of the US economy. Together with high energy
and food prices, this will restrain the world economy
especially in the short run. Nevertheless, firm profits
and labour market developments will remain
favourable overall.
After approximately three years of continued high
growth, the US economy started to cool down
markedly at the end of 2005 when the US housing
market began to deteriorate. Residential investment
has been falling for eight subsequent quarters and
real estate prices have dropped and thereby deterio-
rated the wealth position of home owners. The latter
factor, which boosted consumption in the past, now
works in the reverse direction. During this year, we
will continue to see home owners turn insolvent and
house prices to decrease further. However, in view of
the still strong world economy and the continued
weakness of the US dollar, exports will support US
growth. The 2008 performance of the US economy is
difficult to predict due to the declining house prices
and the subprime crisis, the full impact of which is
still unclear. Although recent stock market develop-
ments signal grave concerns about cyclical develop-
ments, it is not in our view very likely that the USeconomy will fall into recession. Recessionary ten-
dencies will be counteracted by both low interest
rates and a substantial fiscal stimulus programme.
Our forecast is that US GDP will grow by 1.7 percent
in 2008. Nevertheless, continuing falls in US real
estate prices and enduring turbulence in internation-
al financial markets remain substantial downward
risks. 
The contribution of Asia to world economic growth
has increased substantially over time. The emerging
economies of Asia posted superb GDP growth rates
last year, notwithstanding the growth slowdown in
the US and the turbulence in international financial
markets. Over time, domestic demand has turned
into the main engine of growth. Affected by the
slowdown in US import demand, exports from the
region have already lost some momentum. But
domestic demand in the Asian economies remains
strong and will probably be able to buffer some of
the slowdown in the world economy. So far, the sub-
prime crisis in US financial markets has not affected
the Asian banking sector. Bank credit supply has
continued to be accommodating and the spread
between firm and government bonds has hardly
widened. 
The European economy
For the second year in a row, the European Union
managed to grow at a rate of close to 3 percent in
2007. In particular, growth dynamics in Germany,
Spain and the UK helped achieve this positive
result. On a country level, strong domestic demand
was usually the main contributing factor. Non-res-
idential investment remained an important factor
behind demand growth. Because of positive labour
market developments, consumption gained mo-
mentum again. Real wage increases last year were
small and below those of the US and Japan. But
because of the exchange rate developments, the
cost competitiveness position of European coun-
tries deteriorated substantially. Nevertheless, net
exports again contributed positively to GDP
growth in the euro area.
After the outbreak of the credit crisis, producer con-
fidence in the EU has started to crumble. Because of
the appreciation of the euro and the consequent
reduction of US imports, growth in the European
Union will fall during the first half of this year,
bringing economic growth back to its potential. Also
a slower expansion of investment in Europe is con-
tributing to lower growth. The output gap, however,
will remain positive allowing employment to increase
further. But since inflation will remain high, especial-
ly during the first half of this year, and wage increas-
es are likely to stay moderate, private consumption
will increase more or less at the same pace as last
year. Overall, GDP growth will level off to 2.1 and
1.8 percent this year in EU27 and the euro area,
respectively.
Over the last two decades there has been a very sig-
nificant fall in the rate of wage increase in most EU
countries. These low wage increases are often seen as
a major cause of weak private consumption. We find
that the main causes of the decline in nominal wage
growth are lower inflation (associated with low-infla-
tion policy of central banks) and lower productivity
growth. Declining union density in many countries
and moves towards more corporatism in some have
also contributed somewhat. 
The economic upswing in 2007 continued to reduce
fiscal deficits and government debt throughout
Europe last year. Although total government expendi-
tures did increase somewhat, tax revenues grew even
more. In a majority of countries, the consolidation of
public finances continued. In particular in Germany,
but also in Hungary, Italy and Portugal, measures
were implemented to reduce the structural budget
deficit. In the two years to come, fiscal policy will,
however, turn expansionary again. 
In the euro area, the monetary conditions have
tightened over the last two years. This is explained
by the steady increase in the main refinancing rate of
the ECB (in eight steps since December 2005 – two
of which took place in March and June last year)
and the appreciation of the euro during the same
period. During the course of 2007, the euro appreci-
ated by more than ten percent against the US dollar.
Despite this tight monetary policy stance, inflation
has surged in recent months. During the last two
months of 2007, the annual inflation rate went
above three percent. Also during the first months of
2008, inflation will remain well above the ECB tar-
get of two percent. The restrictive monetary policy
stance will bring inflation back to around two per-
cent in 2009. 
Real estate markets and the financial system
The real estate crisis in the US and its repercussions




of the current and future business cycle develop-
ments in the world. Not only do real estate prices
affect the profitability of building houses and thus
residential investment, they are also a fundamental
determinant of household wealth and hence of pri-
vate consumption. Furthermore, and as suggested
by developments during the past months, develop-
ments associated with real estate markets can jeop-
ardise the stability of the financial system. A sharp
rise in home foreclosures and defaults on subprime
mortgages in the US during last summer led to a re-
evaluation of related mortgage-backed securities. As
it was – and to some extent still is – unclear to what
extent and where most of the losses from the US
mortgage loans will hit the banking sector, banks
became reluctant to lend to each other. To prevent
interbank money markets from becoming illiquid,
central banks around the world had to step in.
Although banks report that recent tensions are
hampering their access to funding and are causing a
tightening of credit standards, at least up until now,
interest rates for non-financial corporations and
households loans in Europe do not appear to have
been affected by much. Neither have credit volumes
so far. Because of the robust growth in other parts
of the world economy and the interventions of cen-
tral banks worldwide, the repercussions from the
real estate crisis in the US are likely to be much less
severe than has recently been suggested in much of
the press. 
Chapter 2: How far could the dollar fall? 
How much dollar depreciation should Europe and the
world expect in the future as a consequence of the US
external imbalance? To what extent will the dollar fall
be accompanied by a global realignment of Asian
currencies, supposedly reducing the pressure on the
euro? Early on, leading economists concluded that
eliminating a current account deficit of five percent of
GDP in an economy like the US would require a real
exchange rate depreciation of between 35 and 50 per-
cent. Meanwhile, from its peak in 2002 to the begin-
ning of 2007, the dollar lost almost one third of its
value in real terms (CPI-based). Against the major
currencies the fall was much more pronounced, about
40 percent in real terms: against the euro the fall has
been almost 50 percent in real terms. 
Assessments of the real dollar depreciation required
to correct the large current account imbalances of
the US play an important role in the debate, as they
can provide a natural anchor for expectations of the
value of the dollar in the medium and the long run.
The world has already experienced ample swings in
the dollar-euro exchange rate. Early on in the
decade, this rate almost reached 80 dollar cents per
euro; under current circumstances one cannot rule
out a fall to as low a level as 1.60 dollars per euro.
But can the exchange rate be expected to remain
persistently at such a level? Or is the current devel-
opment of the dollar exchange rate yet another
example of dramatic overshooting in currency mar-
kets? This chapter addresses these questions by
reconsidering in detail the specific mechanisms by
which real dollar depreciation is an essential step
towards global adjustment. 
First, we argue that the largest estimates of real dollar
depreciation (in the range of 35–50 percent in real
terms) usually assume a very strong adjustment in the
domestic relative prices of non-tradable goods (ser-
vices) within the US and abroad. The experience of
the 1980s and econometric evidence suggest that
strong movements in these relative prices are not plau-
sible. Most of the adjustment works through interna-
tional relative prices: the terms of trade (export rela-
tive to import prices) and the real exchange rate
(domestic relative to foreign consumer prices) move
closely together. 
Second, we discuss recent contributions that, building
on general-equilibrium trade models, actually predict
much milder scenarios of real dollar depreciation.
Real depreciation between 10 and 20 percent may well
be enough to achieve sustainable current account
adjustment.
What does this mean for Europe? Early assess-
ments of the equilibrium exchange rate between
the euro and the dollar, especially the ones based
on purchasing power parity, by and large pointed
to values between 0.90 and 1.30 dollars per euro.
In early 2008, at 1.48 dollars per euro, the dollar
has probably already overshot the value that
would be required for global rebalancing – espe-
cially if Asian countries end their (explicit or
implicit) pegs to the dollar. This does not, howev-
er, by any means rule out the possibility that the
dollar could fall much more in the short and medi-
um term, especially if central banks in countries
with large dollar reserves started shifting out of
them. If so, there could be a further severe deteri-
oration of the cost competitiveness of the euro-
zone, which could reinforce any slowdown.Chapter 3: Globalisation and jobs
Much of the Western European debate on globalisa-
tion has focused on the risk that increased competi-
tion from foreign workers with low wages will cause
job losses. This could occur because of import com-
petition, outsourcing or labour immigration. The
fears in the public debate stand in stark contrast to
the views of most economists, who tend instead to
stress the long-run welfare gains from international
integration.
Unemployment and labour market rigidities
The unemployment risks from globalisation arise
mainly because labour markets in Western Europe may
not be flexible enough. If globalisation leads to a fall in
demand for labour as a whole or for certain categories
of labour such as the unskilled, employment will suffer
in the presence of rigidities that prevent downward
wage adjustments. Increased trade with low-wage
economies leads to a contraction of labour-intensive
sectors in advanced economies and to an expansion of
skill- and capital-intensive sectors. But if wages are
rigid, there will be an overexpansion of the skill- and
capital-intensive sectors and too large a contraction of
labour-intensive sectors. The result is then unemploy-
ment, especially among the low-skilled. Such unem-
ployment would prevent the aggregate gains from
increased international integration from being realised.
However, in a complete analysis one should not take
rigidities in Western European labour markets as
given. Instead, the extent of trade integration and
international factor mobility are probably impor-
tant determinants of these rigidities. So, to gauge
the long-run effects one must analyse how the rigidi-
ties themselves are affected by globalisation. We
argue that globalisation could increase labour mar-
ket flexibility to such an extent that adverse employ-
ment effects are unlikely in the longer term. It might
even be the case that globalisation promotes em-
ployment when one takes all effects into account. If
so, globalisation will not be a curse for employment
in Western Europe; instead it could turn out to be a
blessing.
Six arguments why globalisation might be good for
employment
We analyse a number of mechanisms through which
globalisation might help raise employment in Europe
by reducing market imperfections:
1. International outsourcing to low-wage economies
(imports of intermediary inputs) imply cost sav-
ings, which give rise to positive scale effects on
domestic labour demand. This could very well out-
weigh the negative labour demand effects resulting
from substitution of foreign for domestic labour
via such imports.
2. Increased trade integration implies stronger com-
petitive pressures and thus larger sensitivity of
product demand to prices. This tends to reduce
firms’ price-cost mark-ups and increase the
demand for output and thus also the labour
demanded by producers.
3. An increased sensitivity of product demand to
prices also has the indirect effect of increasing the
sensitivity of labour demand to wages. The larger
possibilities of substituting intermediary inputs
produced by foreign labour for domestic labour
works in the same direction. A higher sensitivity of
labour demand to wages raises the costs in terms
of employment losses of high wages and therefore
strengthens trade union incentives for wage mod-
eration.
4. The potential threat that employers can offshore
production and close down domestic production
facilities improves the relative bargaining position
of employers vis-à-vis unions. Hence, the outcome
of wage negotiations will be closer to the bargain-
ing goals of employers. 
5. Globalisation may trigger changes in labour mar-
ket institutions. By reducing the market power of
domestic firms, the rents to be shared between
owners and unions become smaller. This reduces
the gains from collective bargaining for employ-
ees and could therefore contribute to deunionisa-
tion. In addition, the political incentives to
uphold government regulation supporting high
wages (generous unemployment benefits, rules
allowing unions wide scope for strike action,
favourable conditions for union membership
etc.) are likely to be weakened by globalisation:
when the possibilities of employers to move pro-
duction abroad to low-wage locations increase,
such regulation becomes less effective in securing
high wages, as the costs in terms of lower
employment rise.
6. Finally, trade with low-wage economies has
implied  terms-of-trade gains for advanced eco-
nomies, that is increases in export prices relative
to import prices. Such a development implies that
producer prices increase at a faster pace than the
CPI. Hence, real product wages (wages relative to




more slowly than real consumption wages (wages
relative to the CPI), which is beneficial for
employment. 
Empirical research on globalisation and jobs 
Although earlier research had problems substanti-
ating that trade integration with low-wage eco-
nomies shifts demand away from the low-skilled to
the high-skilled, more evidence in favour of this
has been accumulating in the more recent literature
on international outsourcing. Less interest has
been devoted to the issue of how overall employ-
ment in advanced economies is affected by trade
integration. There are only a few studies of overall
labour demand, which on the whole fail to find
adverse effects when scale effects are taken into
account.
The problem with labour demand studies is that
they examine the relationship between employment
and wages, but do not take possible wage responses
to globalisation into account. We instead make an
attempt to capture the “general-equilibrium”effects
of globalisation on unemployment and employ-
ment. This is done by augmenting conventional
regressions of these variables on a number of
labour market institutions (the unemployment ben-
efit replacement rate, the tax wedge, the degree of
corporatism etc.) with variables such as trade open-
ness, import dependence, and the extent of capital
mobility vis-à-vis low-wage economies. The exercise
is crude and should be interpreted with caution.
Yet, it is noteworthy that we fail to find adverse
employment effects of globalisation if we control
for labour market institutions and the business
cycle. If anything, the results suggest positive effects
instead.
What to do and what not to do
An absence of adverse employment effects – or the
possible existence of positive effects – does not
imply that economic policy-makers should not
respond to globalisation. It is likely to raise wage
inequality and shift the functional income distribu-
tion in favour of capital. So, an important task of
economic policy is to try to allocate the aggregate
gains from globalisation in a “fair way”and see to it
that groups which might otherwise lose out (or
receive only small gains) also share the benefits. It is
this, rather than to prevent employment losses, that
is the likely main challenge to economic policy from
globalisation. 
However, redistribution policies should be pursued
in such a way that they support – and do not coun-
teract – the general policy objective of raising
employment. This speaks strongly against such poli-
cies as rises in unemployment benefits and the impo-
sition of minimum wages (as are now being imple-
mented in Germany). Measures such as retraining
schemes, government support to displaced workers
through severance pay, wage insurance (for displaced
workers taking up a new lower-paid job), and
employment tax credits to low-wage earners in gen-
eral are more promising. They serve to compensate
potential losers from globalisation for wage losses,
but do not distort the incentives for employment. At
the same time, such attempts to ensure a fair sharing
of the gains from globalisation also have costs. So,
although some policy interventions to deal with the
income distribution consequences of globalisation
are justified, one should carefully weigh the benefits
of this against the costs.
Chapter 4: Globalisation and industrial policy
Fears of globalisation and deindustrialisation have
given rise to new demands for industrial policy inter-
vention. The background is the emergence of new
international players like China and India, and the
greater competition worldwide, which calls for signif-
icant restructuring in advanced economies. Proposals
for targeted industry aid and the promotion of
“champions” have become frequent. France has been
at the forefront of this approach. These arguments
have come on top of the traditional ones of aid and
protection for strategic industries related to national
security. This raises a number of issues. What role
should industrial policy play in the face of globalisa-
tion? Is there still scope for traditional sector-based
policy? Must EU industry be defended? And at what
levels of government should industrial policy be for-
mulated? 
The objectives of industrial policy
The Lisbon Agenda of the EU states that: “The
main role of industrial policy at EU level is to proac-
tively provide the right framework conditions for
enterprise development and innovation in order to
make the EU an attractive place for industrial invest-
ment and job creation, taking account of the factthat most businesses are small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs).” A broad interpretation of
industrial policy would include microeconomic poli-
cies (antitrust, innovation and internationalisation
policies), the provision of broad infrastructures (in
transport, telecommunications, education, science
and research) and sector-based aid to companies. In
a narrower sense, industrial policy refers only to the
sector measures directly aimed at companies and
industries.
We believe that the most important challenge of in-
dustrial policy in the EU is to foster the competitive-
ness of its companies and the productivity of the
economy in order to raise the welfare of European
citizens. With this aim in mind we recognise that there
are several arguments that favour an active sector-
based industrial policy. Such arguments include: pro-
viding suitable incentives for companies to enter and
exit the market; helping to achieve a strategic edge in
the international market; assisting in efficient (and
fair) restructuring of declining industries; leveraging
positive external effects; helping to coordinate invest-
ment; and alleviating imperfections in the capital
market.
Adverse side effects of industrial policy 
However, although it is easy to find strong theo-
retical arguments that can justify sector-based in-
dustrial policy and state aid, the implementation in
practice is associated with very large problems like-
ly to undo the potential benefits and result in net
welfare losses. Sector-based interventions 
• require highly detailed information on the indus-
try, which is unlikely to be available;
• can trigger strategic behaviour from rival countries
with potential spiralling trade reprisals;
• are often captured by specific interests for the pur-
pose of rent seeking; 
• can restrict competition to the detriment of con-
sumers and damage production efficiency with
long-run adverse effects on international competi-
tiveness; and
• are often costly to the public both because of the
direct tax costs and because of the indirect costs as
higher taxes induce distortionary behavioural
responses. 
These considerations argue strongly against letting
globalisation pressures lead to a revival of traditional
sector-based industrial policy. In particular, we argue
that protection of productive sectors must be limited
in time with credible and irrevocable commitments,
and must maintain a healthy level of competition
between companies. This applies especially to declin-
ing industries where established interests tend to pro-
long protection well beyond what is required in terms
of efficiency and fairness. These considerations are
particularly important as the fast pace of globalisa-
tion is likely to strengthen the demand for such pro-
tection, at the same time as the costs of locking
resources into declining sectors and thus relinquishing
– or postponing – the gains from reallocation of
resources to more productive uses have probably
become much larger.
The case for horizontal industrial policy 
European countries still allocate an important –
though shrinking – portion of their spending to sec-
tor-based policies (for example, in steel, shipbuilding
and coal). However, an increasing share is allocated
to so-called horizontal policies that affect various
sectors more equally. Such policies include support
for R&D activities, training of human capital, provi-
sion of infrastructure, promotion of internationali-
sation (brand image, sales networks, etc.) and aid for
SMEs.
A microeconomic framework that maintains efficient
functioning of markets is crucial for competitiveness.
In most EU countries, there appears to be plenty of
margin to increase competition in the services indus-
try: in transportation, telecoms, healthcare, the ener-
gy sector, professional services, retail trade, and also
in the knowledge industry (universities and research
centres). 
There are many good reasons for the establishment
of regulations, such as the protection of the labour
force or the environment. Regulation should also be
established in situations where competition is not
workable, such as with natural monopoly segments
like transport or distribution in electricity and gas
markets. In general, though, regulation should be
non-intrusive and, in particular, the “cost of doing
business” in a country should be kept low. It is wor-
rying that the costs of doing business appear to be
high in some Southern European countries, such as
Greece and Italy, and also in some new EU coun-
tries, such as Romania, the Czech Republic, Slo-
venia, Hungary and Poland. These countries would




as in the UK, Ireland, the Nordic countries, Estonia
and Lithuania.
The appropriate level for industrial policy
A final important issue is the level of government at
which industrial policy should be located. For several
reasons, we believe that where possible, policy should
be formulated at the regional level. First, there are
information advantages at a regional level: regional
government can monitor economic activity in more
detail than can be done at the national or supra-
national level. Second, it is inevitable that production
and consumption externalities are felt most strongly
at the regional level. Third, lobbying and capture is
probably less prevalent at the regional level. Fixed
costs of lobbying mean that lobbyists tend to concen-
trate their resources on those policy makers who have
most influence over resources, that is at the national
level. Lobbying at the level of individual regions is
likely to offer much smaller returns. 
Competition between regions to attract firms can gen-
erate information and limit capture. It can produce
efficient outcomes when the deadweight loss of taxa-
tion is low and regions are asymmetric in the sense
that external benefits of firms’ location are unevenly
distributed. This seems indeed to be the case, as there
is substantial diversity in the performance of EU
regions, which is not diminishing over time (despite
convergence across nation-states). 
But there is also an important role for the EU to play
in providing a framework of common rules to inter-
nalise externalities and limit rent-shifting incentives.
For example, it could be argued that European funds
(such as R&D support) should be allocated on a merit
basis through competitive bidding procedures which
should be decided by committees of experts insulated
as much as possible from political pressures. The
model of the European Research Council to allocate
funds to science, modelled after the US National
Science Foundation, is a good example. 
The EU is well placed to determine general horizontal
industrial policy measures that respond to the chal-
lenges posed by globalisation. This is partly because it
is capable of internalising the externalities that cross
national borders, and which are becoming increasing-
ly more relevant. Perhaps more importantly, the EU
can benefit from greater economies of scale in
addressing the issues which arise as a result of global-
isation. An example would be to set a common ener-
gy policy that diversifies supply sources and the port-
folio of technologies in a large integrated EU energy
market. 
In sum, we believe that the national level is in many
cases the most unsuitable one for deciding industrial
policy. Rather policy should be set at either the re-
gional level or the EU level. For a number of reasons,
these two levels are generally in a better position to
design policy measures to confront globalisation. This
is so because of the strong local external effects and
information advantage at the regional level and
because of the economies of scale that can be exploit-
ed at the EU level.
Chapter 5: Global warming
To date, the public policy discussion of climate
change has focused on the reduction of demand for
fossil fuels, the implicit assumption being that lower
demand will automatically lead to less use of these
fuels and therefore to less of CO2 emissions into the
atmosphere. For example, this way of thinking char-
acterises the celebrated Stern report. The flaw in this
reasoning is that it neglects the supply side. As in
other markets, the extraction of fossil fuels is deter-
mined by the interaction of demand and supply. A
fall in demand, leading to lower prices of fossil fuels,
will be translated into a fall in extraction only to the
extent that market supply shrinks after a price
decline. For this reason, proper policies to fight
global warming require an analysis of the supply
side. Such analysis has so far been more or less
neglected.
The consumption-reducing measures by some
Western countries will be in vain if owners of fossil
fuel resources do not cut back their supply. Without
supply cuts, world energy prices will fall so much that
other countries consume and burn exactly the quanti-
ties not demanded by the “green”countries. Countries
doing little with regard to climate protection will
enjoy an implicit subsidy on their energy demand
resulting from the restraint of the green countries.
China and India will continue to step up their CO2-
intensive growth policies and Americans will drive
even more SUVs than they would otherwise do.
The supply of fossil deposits that nature has made
available is independent of the price reactions that
the consumer countries can influence. If the market
supply that resource owners make available from
nature’s total supply is also independent of such pricereactions, improvements in housing insulation, the
conversion to bio diesel and the construction of cars
with lower fuel consumption will be useless from the
point of view of reducing CO2 emissions. California’s
windmills and solar-panelled roofs and France’s
nuclear reactors will make no contribution to
addressing global warming as they are supplied only
in addition to fossil energy. Thus, what happens to
global warming depends on how the resource owners
behave. Unfortunately, it is not elected leaders in sta-
ble democracies, such as Arnold Schwarzenegger or
Angela Merkel, who will determine the pace of cli-
mate change, but people like Hugo Chávez,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Putin’s oligarchs and the
Arab oil sheiks.
The time path of extraction and demand-management
policies
The difficulty of predicting the behaviour of
resource owners results from the fact that their sup-
ply decisions are inherently intertemporal ones,
which are governed by different economic consider-
ations than the supply decisions of producers of
reproducible commodities. The insight that it is not
only current prices, but also expected future prices,
that influence the rate of extraction of non-renew-
able resources is key to analysing the supply of fos-
sil fuels. The supply reactions that do occur will
depend on the whole future time path of prices. The
decision problem of resource owners can be charac-
terised as one where they choose between (i) extract-
ing the resource now and investing the proceeds in
financial markets to earn a future financial return;
and (ii) keeping the stock in the ground and benefit-
ing from future price rises as the resources turn
scarcer.
The time path of fuel fossil prices expected by suppli-
ers will depend on how they expect policies designed
to affect demand to develop over time. If today’s
demand restrictions are not expected to continue in
the future, then suppliers will defer extraction. If
future restrictions are expected to be stricter, then
suppliers have an incentive to extract more now.
Suppliers’ decisions will depend on both demand
restrictions implemented at present and the expecta-
tions of future restrictions.
It follows that measures to reduce the demand for
fossil fuels may not work. For resource extraction
to be slowed today, it is not enough with such
demand-reducing measures today. In addition, sup-
pliers must expect these measures to be loosened
over time such that it becomes profitable to defer
extraction until a future date when prices will be
higher than would otherwise be the case. But such a
development is extremely unlikely. Instead, the
opposite evolution of demand restrictions is almost
certain. As global warming increases, the calls for
measures to address climate change will likely grow
louder, resulting in increasingly strict demand-
reduction policies in the future. (Also, the difficul-
ties to agree internationally on such policies and the
desire to give both producers and consumers time
to adjust give a strong incentive to phase in all
demand-reducing measures slowly over time.) As
resource providers anticipate such developments,
they will intensify extraction today. This green para-
dox may be one of the reasons why world con-
sumption of fossil fuels and output of carbon diox-
ide has increased unabated in recent years, despite
the Kyoto Protocol. 
What might work?
In light of this “green paradox” of environmental
policies, the measures currently demanded by govern-
ments that ratified the Kyoto Protocol have little in
common with policy efforts that would be truly effec-
tive in reducing global warming. Meaningful mea-
sures would have to be of other types.
One useful measure – not immediately obvious to
most people – could be the introduction of worldwide
withholding taxes on capital income along with a
closing of tax havens. The consequence would be a
deterioration of the investment alternatives of
resource owners, which would increase the relative
profitability of keeping fossil fuel resources in the
ground. 
This would counteract the current tendency to
overextraction that results from “insecure property
rights”, that is the uncertainty on the part of current
resource owners (mainly with respect to oil in politi-
cally unstable countries) regarding whether they – or
their “dynasties” will be there to reap the returns
from extraction in the future. It would thus also help
slow down global warming. Doing this would be
advisable even in the case of secure property rights,
as markets in general tend to neglect the negative
externalities resulting from global warming and to
extract fossil fuels more rapidly than what would be
socially efficient. (Slowing down global warming




dard of future generations without reducing the liv-
ing standard of current generations, by tilting the
portfolio composition of bequests from man-made
capital above ground to natural capital under
ground.)
If an emissions trading system is to work, it must
become truly comprehensive. This means it would
have to include all customer countries and be with-
out any loopholes such that demand reductions in
one part of the world do not lead to price reductions
that only stimulate demand elsewhere. The implica-
tion would be that customer countries form a world-
wide  monopsony that can dictate quantities and
force the resource exporters to supply the desired
amounts. 
What remains as policy options goes beyond the
attempts to modify supply and demand for fossil
fuels but seeks the solution in storing CO2-generated
by combustion processes away from the atmosphere.
There are two promising alternatives. The first one is
to exploit the technical possibilities of sequestering
carbon dioxide, that is storing it in liquid form
underground. The second one, which should be given
top priority, is reforestation, as forests are the largest
absorbers of carbon under human control. Cur-
rently, deforestation is leading to the release of more
carbon dioxide than that emitted by the whole trans-
portation sector. If reforestation were to replace for-
est destruction, global warming could be slowed
down significantly.
The economics of climate change and the economics
of exhaustible resources are closely intertwined, for in
essence the problem of global warming is the problem
of gradually transporting the available stock of car-
bon from underground into the atmosphere, with use-
ful oxidisation on the way. Unfortunately, most policy
proposals ignore this insight and seek to reduce car-
bon demand without concern for the price path of
carbon and the corresponding supply reactions. This
oversight may result in the green paradox of measures
actually increasing the fossil fuel extraction they are
intended to reduce. To find useful policies that miti-
gate the problem of global warming, we must remem-
ber that economics teaches us to pay attention to both
demand and supply.